Samuelson (1947) stated that a regular equilibrium exhibits the transfer paradox if and only if it is unstable. Gale (1974) and many in the early 1980's debunked this equivalence by adding extra countries, reaching an anti consensus.
Introduction
Germany's reparations after World War I provoked a controversy about terms of trade. Did the reparations improve or worsen her terms of trade? Did the new terms of trade exacerbate or mitigate her income loss due to reparations? Leontief (1937) showed by example that a donation could so change terms of trade as to erase the income loss and benefit donor-the transfer paradox. Samuelson (1947) noted the regular equilibria exhibiting the transfer paradox were those unstable with respect to tatonnement. Others confirmed this beautiful characterization of the transfer paradox, at least with two countries and two commodities; Mundell (1968) , Balasko (1978) .
Theorem 1 (Samuelson 1947 ) With two countries and two goods, suppose a regular equilibrium. Then the local transfer paradox is present if and only if it is unstable.
Most deemed instability a theoretical curiosity, the situation where demand increases with prices. By Samuelson's equivalence, the transfer paradox too became a theoretical curiosity, and interest in it waned. Accordingly, Samuelson's equivalence remained the big result on the transfer paradox, and became the wisdom on the topic, seemingly even after Scarf's (1960) examples of instability.
Almost thirty years later, Gale (1974) showed by example that Samuelson's equivalence broke down with a third country.
Theorem 2 (Gale 1974 ) With three Leontief countries and two goods, there is an example of a stable equilibrium exhibiting the local transfer paradox.
Yet the example failed to shatter the received wisdom, perhaps because Gale never pointed out its stability, never wrote "transfer paradox." Chichilnisky (1980) discovered the stability of Gale's example, and further showed its dependence on the preferences of the countries. That it took so long to detect stability evidenced how ingrained Samuelson's wisdom had been-why check, if it must be unstable? Once advertised, this set off a stampede of research in the early eighties, excited by the surprising news, by the renewed plausibility of the transfer paradox, and by the chance to charge at current wisdom.
The stampede mostly split between extending Gale's counterexample and Chichilnisky's analysis, always with two goods. New examples appeared in Polemarchakis (1983) , and in Leonard and Manning (1983) with non-Leontief utilities (two Cobb-Douglas, one quasilinear). 1 The analyses (a) relaxed utilities from being Leontief, (b) clarified the role of excess demands, marginal propensities to consume, and elasticities of excess demand, (c) derived formulas for the welfare impact of small donations in terms of these notions.
Yano (1983), Ravallion (1983) , Bhagwati et al. (1983) , Dixit (1983) singly managed all these extensions.
Retaining Leontief utilities, Geanakoplos and Heal (1983) , Polemarchakis (1983) , and Chichilnisky (1983) gave a priori, equilibrium-independent bounds on endowments and utilities guaranteeing the equilibrium to be unique, globally stable, and consistent with the transfer paradox. Consensus settled on
• the donor's trade level being required large enough, and on this requisite level being increasing in
• 1) the proximity between the donor's and the recipient's marginal propensities to consume
• 2) the substitution effect, explaining the preponderance of Leontief utilities in examples
In particular, emphasis turned toward the notions in (b) and away from stability.
The remainder focused on the existence question. From Dixit's (1983) formula Safra (1984) obtained Theorem 3 (Safra 1984 ) With more than two countries and with two goods, suppose an unstable equilibrium where some trading country's marginal propensity to consume is neither largest nor lowest. Then there is a stable equilibrium exhibiting the transfer paradox, with the same equilibrium prices and incomes but less trade.
This was another charge, generalizing Gale's example to smooth preferences and multiple countriescuriously, instability did cameo. Earlier, Safra (1983) had argued nonconstructively that for almost any equilibrium prices and incomes, there was a compatible economy exhibiting the transfer paradox. Given any small desired welfare impact and endowment reallocation, Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994) showed 1 Aumann and Peleg (1974) discarded endowments, instead of reallocating them.
more constructively that for almost any equilibrium prices and incomes, there was a compatible economy exhibiting the given welfare impact as the de facto welfare impact of the given reallocation.
Altogether, the stampede set off by Gale We propose a point of view that rescues Samuelson's equivalence and reaffirms the anti consensus, even though the latter arose out of attacks on the former. The key idea is that whether an equilibrium is unstable or stable is a precise answer to whether the trade level is or is not large enough relative to
• 1) the proxinity between the donor's and the recipient's marginal propensities to consume
• 2) the substitution effect
To see it, we revisit the classical decomposition of the Jacobian J of aggregate demand
where S is the sum of the countries' substitution effects, m i is country i 0 s marginal propensity to consume, and z i its excess demand for the nonnumeraire commodities. With two countries, it reads 
Indeed, this reaffirms the anti consensus, in that the threshold trade level s an unambiguous norm is unavailable.
Fixing the price of C commodities and incomes of H countries, implies the aggregate substitution effect S = ΣS i and the marginal propensities to consume (m i ). Discarding the numeraire, S is negative definite and symmetric, hence defines an inner product on net trades n ∈ R C−1 of nonnumeraire commodities, (n, n) = n 0 (−S −1 )n, and a norm, knk = p (n, n). If z = (z h ) are the equilibrium net trades at the equilibrium prices and incomes, the trade level is kzk
What is Samuelson's threshold in this language? Multiplying (|) by −z 1 S −1 ,
Thanks to market clearing,°°z One generalization is to multiple goods C ≥ 2.
Theorem 5 (Threshold with multiple goods) With two countries, the threshold for the transfer paradox at regular equilibria is still
With multiple countries, the donor can play the welfare of one recipient against another's, unboundedly.
With just two countries, this is impossible because there is a sole recipient. For this reason the threshold is no greater than the above. Specifically, for each country let
Theorem 6 (Threshold bounded above) With H, C ≥ 2 countries and goods, the threshold for h to be a protagonist in the transfer paradox at regular equilibria is at most
. So the threshold for the transfer paradox at regular equilibria is at most min h
We now report the threshold for h to be a protagonist.
Definition 1 Fixv ∈ R
H withv h = 1, 1 0v = 0, to be interpreted as the welfare impact of an infinitesimal donation. Then define the numerator
where S ⊂ {1, ..., H}\{h} is as follows. Orderingv
That is, S ⊂ H − h consists of the best off: those better off than the average of the group consisting of the even better off and of h. Now define
Theorem 7 (Threshold computed) With H, C ≥ 2 countries and goods, the threshold for h to be a protagonist in the transfer paradox at regular equilibria is T h . So the threshold for the transfer paradox at regular equilibria is min h T h .
It seems impossible to compute T h in general; after all, the program is the ratio of two convex functions over a noncompact domain. Of course, given particular equilibrium prices and incomes, a computer would.
On the other hand, the upper bound is easily seen to come fromv
h°°°T his gives theorem 6. Further, when H = 2 the constraint setv h = 1, 1 0v = 0 is a singleton, the abovė 
Model
Countries h = 1, ..., H consume commodities c = 1, ..., C, C being the unit of account, in terms of which all value is quoted. Markets assign prices p ∈ P ≡ R (C−1) ++ to commodities c < C, and incomes w ∈ R H ++ to all countries. 4 The set of budget variables is
The price-income equilibria for total resources r ∈ R C ++ are
Unity is the price of C, which P omits. The addition to p of the C coordinate with value unity is denoted p.
In an economy, countries' endowments of commodities make up total resources,
The equilibria are
There is a natural projection π : E(r) → B(r), π(p, e) = (p, e 0 p) and a b−equilibrium is one in π −1 (b).
Demand is neoclassical if there is a utility u
The point of separating budget variables from the economy is that welfare is determined by the budget variables, and in turn these are determined by the economy in equilibrium. We assume Debreu's smooth preferences.
Welfare impact of reallocation
We think of a smooth path e(ξ) through a given economy e = e(0), and of an infinitesimal reallocation Proposition 1 (Envelope) The welfare impactv ∈ R H ofė at a regular equilibrium iṡ
whereṫ ≡ė 0 p is its value, and z ∈ R C×H the countries' excess demands.
5
As we show next, at a regular equilibrium there is a unique price adjustment matrix dp, smooth in a neighborhood of it, such thatṗ = dpṫ. Thus the welfare impact differential is dv * = I − z 0 dp
This implies that the welfare impact depends on the infinitesimal reallocation only through its valueṫ, not its identityė.
Indeed, 1 0ṫ = 1 0ė0 p =ṙ 0 p = 0 given that aggregate resources are fixed, and 1 0 dv * ṫ = (1 0 − 0 0 dp)ṫ = 0
given that total excess demand is zero in equilibrium.
To compute dp, we totally differentiate total nonnumeraire demand
and suppose a path (p(ξ), e(ξ)) of equilibria. Then
is an identity. Differentiating it,
An equilibrium is regular if J is invertible. By the implicit function theorem and Walras' law, at a regular equilibrium (p, e) equilibrium prices are locally a smooth function of the economy.
Proposition 2 (Price Adjustment) At a regular equilibrium the Price Adjustment is 6 dp = −J −1 D w x σ (dp)
This implies that a reallocation matters for prices only through its value, not its identity.
Substituting into (2),
This formula generalizes Dixit (1981) from C = 2 and appears in Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994) .
Note, the welfare impactv * of a reallocation equals its valueṫ if there is no trade z = 0 or if all marginal
Here the sum S ≡ ΣS h λ h is symmetric and negative definite, since each summand S h λ h is.
Definition of threshold
We reinterpret Samuelson's condition for general C, H, in terms of the requisite trade level L ∈ R.
Definition 2 (Trade levels for a protagonist: Necessary and Sufficient) Fix b ∈ B(r) and the as- Whenever L n is necessary and L s is sufficient, L n ≤ L s , so there is at most one threshold:
Definition 3 Call L h ∈ R the b−threshold for h to be a protagonist in the transfer paradox if it is both b−sufficient and necessary for h.
Remark 2 As shown in the introduction, Samuelson's result with C = H = 2 means that a threshold exists and equals 1 k∇k -for both to be protagonists and for the transfer paradox. To fully generalize this, we need to explicitly compute the inverse of the welfare impact differential. 7 Recall, an inner product is the root of a symmetric, positive definite quadratic form, and indeed −S −1 is such according to the consumer theory of Samuelson.
*
Remarkably, the inverse of dv * exists and admits an explicit description! Theorem 8 (The inverse of the welfare impact differential dv * ) Suppose the equilibrium is regular, so that dv * is defined. Then it is invertible, with inverse
Proof. We use the decomposition J = S − D w x σ · z 0 . By definition, the inverse of dv * , should it exist, is a solution (necessarily unique) to the equations dv * s = I, sdv
Likewise, the equation
This follows from remark 1. the numeraire endowments were defined by Walras' law. Suppose a regular b−equilibrium. Thenv is the welfare impact ofṫ iff dv * −1v =ṫ, which by theorem 8 means
A universal example of the arbitrariness of the welfare impact
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies°°z
with equality only if z k = ∇α k for some scalar α k . Applying definition 2 of kzk ,
To find the α = (α k ) achieving equality, substitute z 0 ≡ α∇ 0 in (4) to get
Thus dv * −1v =ṫ holds with
provided thisṫ makes the equilibrium regular, i.e.,¯J(ṫ)¯invertible:
Now¯J(ṫ)¯is polynomial in J(ṫ), which is linear inṫ (writing ∆ = D w x σṫ ) :
So¯J(ṫ)¯is polynomial inṫ, hence zero for all but finitely many values-unless it is the zero polynomial, which the choiceṫ =v rules out: J(v) = S is negative definite, invertible, making |J(v)| nonzero.
A universal example of the transfer paradox
For each price-income equilibrium, we construct a compatible equilibrium with the transfer paradox.
Corollary 1 (Universal example of the transfer paradox)
Then for all λ > 0 but for finitely many values, the λ-donation from h to i,ṫ = λ(1 i − 1 h ), benefits h and hurts i and fixes all others' welfare,v * = 1 h − 1 i , at the regular b−equilibrium defined by the economy e ≡ x(b) − z with excess demands
and numeraire endowments set by the budget identity e 0 p = w
Proof. This follows from theorem 9 sinceṫ −v * = −λv 
Safra (1983) is a predecessor, concluding nonconstructively that ∞ is b−sufficient. Note, with H = 2 this says that 1 k∇k is sufficient, giving half of Samuelson's result. In this example everyone's welfare is fixed other than the donor and the recipient's; in contrast, with H > 2 there are paradoxical equilibria with even less trade, where the donor affects everyone's welfare. This is not the threshold with H > 2.
6 The threshold for the transfer paradox "subject to the transfer paradox." To formalize this we consider a problem for each possible protagonist h ::
The constraints This is true by definition 4.
. We make T h (b) more explicit by considering the auxiliaryv-problem
The value of this problem is uniquely achieved. Uniqueness owes to the strict convexity of the objective and the convexity of the feasible set. Existence of a minimizer owes to the continuity of the objective and to the fact, which we show next, that the closed feasible set can be intersected with a compact ball without affecting the problem's value. Indeed,ṫ = 0 is feasible and makes°°ṫ −v°°2 = kvk 2 , so the infimum is necessarily the limit of some sequence ofṫ 0 s inside the compact ball°°ṫ −v°°2 ≤ kvk 2 . Letṫ (v) be the unique minimizer.
Thus ifṫ n ,v n is a feasible sequence making kṫn−vnk 2
because for each n the latter is no larger than the former but still at least T h (b). We conclude
We now report n(v).
Lemma 1 (Best donation given welfare impact) Fixv h = 1, 0 = 1 0v . Problem n's value is
where, on orderingv
That is, S ⊂ H − h is the best off: those better off than the average of those even better off joined by h.
Proof. See appendix.
For example, ifv
Corollary 3 (Protagonist's threshold bounded above) An explicit upper bound is
being the difference from the mean of all others' marginal propensities to consume.
Proof. We knowv
h°°°C orollary 4 (Appearance of protagonist) Fix b ∈ B(r) and assumption 1. Then h is a protagonist in the transfer paradox at some equilibrium with any trade level above
Corollary 5 (Threshold with multiple goods ) Suppose H = 2. Fix b ∈ B(r) and assumption 1.
Then the threshold trade level T h (b) for h to be a protagonist in the transfer paradox is exactly
Proof. When H = 2, the constraint setv h = 1, 0 = 1 0v in (??) is a singleton, namelyv
so the upper bound is the infimum.
Samuelson (1947) is the special case H = 2 = C of this.
Remark 5
It is hard to make the infimum more explicit, since the objective is the ratio of two nonconcave functions and the constraint set not compact with H > 2.
Proof of Envelope proposition
By Roy's identity with
In equilibrium w h = e h0 p so dw h = e h0 dp + p 0 de h Letting dt h = p 0 de h and substituting,
= −x h dp + e h0 dp + dt h = dt h − z h0 dp
Minimizing kt − vk
Using the constraints,°°ṫ
with constraint −x ≤ 0.
By Kuhn-Tucker (with constraint qualification holding by linearity of the constraint), x ≥ 0 solves the problem iff there is a nonnegative multiplier µ ≥ 0 satisfying complementary slackness such that x minimizes L,
This being a convex function, its minimum in R H−1 is achieved at DL = 0 :
That is, for the largest n such that (10) . Further, this description is independent of how ties in v −h are ordered.
Proof. Since S ⊂ {1, ..., H}\{h} must satisfy both (10), (11) it is clear that it consists of the indices corresponding to the |S| largest elements in v −h . To see it is the largest, it suffices to show S + = S + i n+1
violates (10):
To see this description is independent of how ties in v −h are ordered, it suffices to show S is closed under ties. That is, ifv i n =v i n+1 and i n ∈ S, we want i n+1 ∈ S. This is immediate, because i n+1 satisfies (10) since i n ∈ S andv i n =v i n+1 , and S as described is largest with respect to (10).
We make a few observations about y S+h . It is monotonically decreasing in S. Also, y S > s if S 6 = ∅, and S = ∅ iff x = 0.
Having found S = S(y), the candidate minimizer is described uniquely by substituting (??) in (8):
Then the value n (v) 2 of the problem is given by S :
kx − yk Too see why, it suffices that y i k > y T −i k+1 +h , which follows from rewriting y i k+1 > y T +h as y i k+1 > y T −i k+1 +h and recalling y i k ≥ y i k+1 .
It follows that S = ∅ iffv i1 ≤ s iffv −h ≤ 1s, and then n (v) 2 = kyk 
